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There is no question that the US has endured a dramatic period of foreclosure activity 
unlike any period in recent decades.  National foreclosure starts increased from 1.5 million in 
2007 to 2.8 million in 2009, and the share of mortgage loans that were seriously delinquent 
reached 5.2% by the third quarter of 2008, compared to the 1979-2006 average of 1.7% and the 
previous high of 2.7% in 2002 (Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund 2009).  This period of increased 
foreclosure activity has introduced new phrases to the public lexicon, most notably for this work, 
the notion of “strategic default,” which occurs when those who can afford to pay make the 
strategic choice to walk away from their mortgage.  Strategic defaults are estimated to make up 
as much as one-quarter of all foreclosures (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009) and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that strategic defaults are becoming more common and more socially 
acceptable.1
Recent academic research has established the price effect of neighboring foreclosures as a 
significant and highly localized feedback effect.  Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) find a 
peak contagion effect of nearby foreclosures on house prices of approximately 1%.  Campbell, 
Giglio, and Pathak (2009) find that each foreclosure within a quarter of a mile radius reduces 
house prices by between 1 and 2% and foreclosures within one tenth of a mile reduce prices by 
approximately 9%. This line of research suggests that local foreclosures impact local house 
prices, but it does not establish a link between neighboring foreclosures and own foreclosures.   
 
                                                             
1 See, for example, Lowenstein, Roger. 2010 “Walk Away from Your Mortgage,” New York Times Magazine, January 
7, 2010 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/magazine/10FOB-wwln-t.html); Streitfeld, David. 2010. “Biggest 
Defaulters on Mortgages Are the Rich,” New York Times, July 8, 2010 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/business/economy/09rich.html); 60 Minutes, May 9, 2010, “Strategic 
Default: Walking Away from Mortgages” 
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/06/60minutes/main6466484.shtml).   
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What differentiates this foreclosure period from the recent past is the potential for non-
price effects, which is supported by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009).  Using survey data, 
they examine the potential importance of social interactions on the propensity to foreclose.  They 
find evidence that an individual who knows someone in foreclosure is more likely to default, and 
that homeowners experiencing a steep equity decline feel less of a moral obligation to repay their 
lender.  These results suggest that foreclosures in concentrated areas is an outcome of a 
contagion effect driven by a reduction in the moral and social constraints on foreclosure, rather 
than the result of a clustering of households more prone to default.   
In this paper, we examine a highly localized contagion effect of foreclosures and find 
strong evidence that social interactions influence the decision to foreclose.  We utilize a hazard 
model and a unique spatially explicit dataset documenting parcel level residential foreclosures in 
Maryland for the years 2006 through 2009.  We combine these data with tax and assessment 
data, loan data, Census, and unemployment data.  These data allow us to control for important 
factors influencing the likelihood of foreclosure within a given community, including the 
prevalence of subprime loans and the distribution of socioeconomic characteristics.  
Additionally, we use the tax data to construct variables describing individual homes, surrounding 
homes, and community.  These variables include structural characteristics of houses, their price 
history, and length of ownership. 
We overcome a number of identification issues common to empirical analyses of social 
interactions.  First, our framework is based on the social interactions hazard model proposed by 
Sirakaya (2006).  We identify the role of social interactions using time varying measures of the 
mean number of neighboring foreclosures and the mean time to foreclosure (since the beginning 
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of the study period) among those neighbors that do foreclose.2
Second, we take advantage of the panel nature of our data, allowing us to avoid issues of 
simultaneity that often hinder identification of social interactions in empirical studies (Manski 
2000).  Specifically, as outlined in Manski (2000) and Brock and Durlauf (2000), using lagged 
values of the social interaction variables overcomes the reflection problem typically encountered 
in social interaction models.   
  We expect that observing 
neighbors that foreclose influences the perception of foreclosure, potentially reducing the stigma 
associated with foreclosure.  Similarly, the mean time to foreclosure among those that have 
foreclosed captures the likely strength of the social interaction.  We expect the strength of social 
interaction to fall over time.  Thus, more recent waves of foreclosure reduce the likelihood of 
foreclosure.  if foreclosures in a neighborhood occur early in the sample period and an individual 
household survives, the household is less likely to foreclose.  At a given point in time, greater 
mean time to foreclosure among neighbors that do foreclose should increase the likelihood of 
foreclosure.  As in Sirakaya (2006), measuring social interaction variables in this manner ensures 
that group and individual determinants of household behavior are nonlinearly related.   
Third, a general concern in social interaction models is choice of group size.  The previous 
literature examining the price spillover effects of neighboring foreclosures have used spatial 
buffers to define reference group membership.  This method of defining group size in urban 
areas of differing densities is problematic for identification and may simply be picking up 
spurious correlation.  Consistent with the social interactions work of Iaonnides (2002), our 
definition of neighbour is the nearest thirteen neighbors by distance.  This measure is sufficiently 
small that spurious correlation among loosely related neighbors is not an issue.   
                                                             
2 The social interaction variables in Sirakaya (2006) are not time varyng. 
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We identify a contagion effect consistent with the view that negative equity is a necessary 
condition for default.  We control for house price expectations using a local repeat sales price 
index, as well as including a variable that measures the extent to which the sales index has fallen 
relative to its peak value.  In addition to house price depreciation, increased originations of 
subprime loans coincide with an increase in foreclosures (Meyer, Pence, and Sherlund 2009).  
We find strong evidence that greater prevalence of subprime loans increases the likelihood of 
observing household foreclosures.  We also find that older, higher quality houses, with longer 
ownership tenures and homes in established communities with fewer rentals are less likely to 
foreclose.  
Most significantly, we find strong evidence that endogenous interactions influence 
foreclosure decisions.  Using our highly localized neighborhood measure we find that a one unit 
increase in neighboring foreclosures increases the hazard of foreclosure by as much as 4% and 
an increase in the mean time to foreclosure increases the hazard rate of foreclosure by less than 
1%.  Both results are statistically significant, suggesting that foreclosures influence the 
likelihood of future foreclosures in their immediate neighborhoods.  This feedback goes beyond 
a temporary reduction in local house prices and implies a negative social multiplier effect as the 
societal norm toward foreclosure changes and a chain of spillovers potentially ensues.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section outlines social 
interactions as they relate to residential foreclosures.  Section 2 presents the duration models 
used in the analysis, followed by a discussion of the variables chosen for the analysis.  Results 
are presented in section 4.  The last section provides concluding remarks. 
 
Social Interactions and Foreclosures 
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There is a well defined literature on social interactions pioneered by Manski (1995).  Social 
interactions arise from three sources – endogenous interactions, contextual interactions, and 
correlated effects – which are explained in the context of foreclosures in the following 
paragraphs.  Endogenous interactions are of most interest in this study because their presence 
implies homeowners alter behavior in response to the observed behavior of their neighbors.   
Contextual interactions occur when the behavior of an individual group member varies 
with exogenous events or exogenous characteristics of other group members.  Foreclosures may 
cluster into certain neighborhoods due to job losses initiated by a single employer or a specific 
employment sector.  These workers (and potential neighbors) may have very different socio-
economic characteristics, yet have a common employer.  In this case, we might observe 
foreclosures clustering in particular neighborhoods – observationally consistent with contagion 
due to an endogenous interaction – but the clustering is due to common job losses.  An example 
that is particularly relevant in the current foreclosure episode is a common decrease in local 
house prices, which is independent of the impact of neighboring foreclosures on prices.  A 
uniform decrease in local house prices may cause foreclosures to cluster into neighborhoods, 
having the appearance of an endogenous interaction.    
Correlated effects occur when individuals with similar preferences, individual 
characteristics, or institutional environments act in a similar manner.  The composition of 
neighborhoods is the outcome of a sorting process, wherein households with similar 
socioeconomic characteristics sort into neighborhoods according to variation in the suite of 
amenities offered by different neighborhoods (Ioannidies and Zabel 2002).  In this case, spatial 
clustering of foreclosures occurs because households with higher inherent propensity to foreclose 
have sorted into neighborhoods.  In the period leading up to the current foreclosure crisis low 
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income households were more likely to have subprime loans, which are more sensitive to price 
decreases and foreclosure (Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen 2009).   
We are interested in identifying endogenous interactions in residential foreclosure 
decisions.  Endogenous interaction effects occur when the actions of others cause members of a 
group to act in a similar manner.  Manski (2000) identifies three economic processes within 
endogenous interactions: preference, expectations, and constraints interactions.  Constraint 
interactions arise when the actions of one agent influence the feasible set of options available to 
another agent; congestion or publicly available knowledge from research and development are 
examples.  Expectations interactions are generated by observational learning, wherein agents 
form expectations based on observed actions and choices of others.  Finally, social interactions 
may occur when an agents preferences are influenced by the actions or choices made by 
members of the individuals reference group.  Preference interactions might result from 
conformism, stigma, or other social influences. 
In the context of residential foreclosures, much of the research effort to date has focussed 
on the price depressing effect of neighboring foreclosures – a constraint interaction.  
Foreclosures increase the supply of houses on the market and decreased upkeep of the foreclosed 
house deteriorates the visual appeal of the neighborhood to potential buyers.  This reduces the 
value of surrounding houses, therefore altering the equity position of surrounding households.  
Previous research indicates that the price depressing effect of local foreclosures is small, but the 
research has not investigated the overall impact of foreclosure on the likelihood of neighboring 
foreclosures.   
We directly examine the endogenous interaction effect of neighborhood foreclosures.  
Within endogenous interactions, we are primarily concerned with the non-price preference 
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interactions of neighboring foreclosures.3
 
  Without question, strong moral and social constraints 
on foreclosure have the effect of preventing households from entering into default when it is in 
their financial interest to do so.  Households’ willingness to default is influenced by the 
possibility of social stigma and moral norms that suggest foreclosure is to be avoided, even at 
significant financial cost.  Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) present evidence that the social 
and moral constraints loosen as the number of foreclosures in a households’ neighborhood 
increases.  The extent to which endogenous preference interactions influence foreclosure is 
dependent on the extent to which each homeowner considers foreclosure an option.  As 
suggested by the preliminary work of Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009), observing others in 
foreclosure is an important driver when considering the option yourself.  In other words, the 
influence of endogenous preference interactions is likely to be highest in situations of strategic 
default.   
The Model 
Following Sirakaya (2006) and Brock and Durlauf (2001), we model social interactions 
as affecting the likelihood of transition from one state to another.  In our case, social interactions 
influence the probability of an individual household defaulting on its mortgage and going into 
foreclosure.  Let T  denote the year the foreclosure occurs, or equivalently, the duration from 
0t =  that the household does not foreclose.  Observations (spells) are realizations of an 
underlying random process that can be characterized by the probability density function (pdf) 
(1) ( ) Pr( )f t t T t tδ= ≤ < +  
and the corresponding cumulative density, 
                                                             
3 Although the  price spillover effects are important considerations when evaluating a neighbor’s foreclosure 
position, at a 1-2% decline per neighboring foreclosure it seems implausible that this marginal, and likely temporary, 
change in equity would lead to a discrete behavioral change like mortgage default. 
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t
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where 0≥T  denotes the duration until failure and t denotes a particular value of T .  The 
survival function, S(t)=1-F(t), is the complement of the cumulative distribution function (cdf) 
and is the mathematical representation of the likelihood of surviving until time t.  Thus 
( ) Pr( )S t T t= > . The survival function serves as the contribution to the likelihood function for 
observations that do not fail during the time under study. 
Finally, the hazard function is the instantaneous probability of failure in the interval tδ  
assuming survival up to time t.  The probability at time t  that a foreclosure occurs by tδ , 
conditional on foreclosure not occurring prior to t , is given by:  
(3) ( )( ) Pr( | )
( )
f tt t T t t T t
S t
λ δ= ≤ < + ≥ =  
The discrete analog to (3) is  
(4) 
0
Pr( | )( ) lim
t








 To facilitate estimation, it is necessary to incorporate covariates.  This is typically accomplished 
by specifying the individual foreclosure hazard function for household h  at time t  with covariate 
vector hz  as  
(5) ( ) ( ) ( )0, exph ht z t zλ λ θ ′= , 
where ( )0 tλ  is the baseline hazard and θ  is a vector of unknown parameters.  The most common 
approach to estimation is maximum likelihood.  Observations are divided into two groups: 
observed failures and censored observations. As observed failures enter the hazard via their 
probability density functions and censored observations enter through their survival functions, 
the general form of the log likelihood function for N observations is written as   
 
 




ln ln[ ( , )] (1 ) ln[ ( , )]
N
i i h i i h
h
L d f t z d S t z
=
= + −∑  
Where zh is observation h’s vector of observed covariates and di is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if the hth observation fails during the study period and 0 if the observation is right-censored. 
From equation (6), it is easy to see how hazard models utilize information from censored 
observations via the likelihood contribution of the survival function.  Equation (6) ignores the 
possibility of time varying covariates.  Including them amounts to adding ‘spells’ to the data, 
where a ‘spell’ is defined as an interval of time and the associated quantities relevant to each 
observation during that interval. That is, an observation will contribute multiple spells of data, 
one for each time interval over which covariates remain constant. 
There are important explicit assumptions involved in estimating a traditional hazard 
model, most noticeably the choice of baseline hazard specification. Since there is no a priori 
reason to suspect any shape of the baseline hazard based on institutional knowledge or past 
experience it is probably most appropriate to utilize either a semi-parametric proportional hazard 
specification which allows the baseline hazard to take any shape without restriction or a Cox 
proportional hazard model where the baseline hazard function is not specified.   
We estimate a series of piecewise exponential hazard models and Cox proportional 
hazard models.  The piece-wise exponential baseline is 
(7) ( ) ( )0 1
G
gg
t tλ λ γ
=
=∑  
where G  is the number of intervals over which the baseline is allowed to vary in the sample, 
( ) 1tγ =  if t g= , and ( ) 0tγ =  otherwise.  We present piecewise exponential models with two 
and four intervals, as well as a Gamma Frailty model.  We present Cox models illustrating 






county. Random and fixed effects models function as in traditional panel models while the 
stratification allows one to recover a baseline hazard by county.  
Social Interactions Model  
The neighborhood of each household is denoted n .Ioannides establishes the importance 
of endogenous interactions in residential neighborhoods, demonstrating that homeowners 
valuations of their own homes depend on the valuations of their immediate neighbors (Ioannides 
2003) and that maintenance decisions depend on the level of maintenance taken on by immediate 
neighbors (Ioannides 2002).4
The probability of foreclosure for household 
  In this paper, each household’s immediate neighborhood is 
comprised of its nearest thirteen neighbors.   
h  depends on household characteristics, hx ; 
characteristics of the households community, cy ; and the foreclosure behavior of neighborhood 
households, ( ) ( ) ( )( ),n h n h n hm υ ω ′= , where ( )n hυ  denotes the proportion of neighborhood households 
that foreclose by time τ  and ( )n hω  denotes the mean time to foreclose among households that 
experience a foreclosure.  Given these elements of the covariate vector hz , the hazard model can 
be rewritten as  
(8) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )0, , , exph c h cn h n ht x y m t x y mλ λ α β ϕ′ ′ ′= + +  
where , , andα β ϕ  are vectors of unknown parameters.  Sirakaya (2006) examines the role of 
social interaction effects in recidivism rates among probationers.  In the Sirakaya framework 
probationers needed to form expectations on the recidivism activity of other probationers in the 
neighbourhood.  The actors in our model directly observe evidence of a neighbors foreclosure 
                                                             






decision through a number of potential channels, including deferred maintenance to the house 
and grounds, or personal knowledge of the neighbor or the neighbors situation.     
We construct variables measuring the actual percentage of foreclosures among the 
nearest thirteen neighbors and the conditional mean time to foreclosure as a quarterly adjusted 
time varying covariate in the model.  It is well documented that identification is an issue in 
interactions models because the group versus individual influences are likely correlated (Brock 
and Durlauf, 2001). However, as noted from Sirakaya’s framework it is not an issue in this 
model because group and individual determinants are nonlinearly related via the construction of 
variables defining ( )n hm .  Further, use of a hazard model overcomes the reflection problem 
discussed by Manski (2000); the data are collected in a panel, permitting specification of the 
likelihood of foreclosure as a function of neighboring foreclosures occurring recently. 
 
Study Area and Background 
Maryland provides a unique opportunity to study the endogenous interaction effects of 
residential foreclosures.  Consistent with the national experience, Maryland experienced a sharp 
increase in foreclosures starting in 2007.  Our study area includes the contiguous block of 
counties in Maryland from the suburbs of Washington, DC to the suburbs of Baltimore as shown 
in Figure 1.  These counties, including Prince George’s County, Montgomery County, Baltimore 
City, Frederick County, Anne Arundel County, and Baltimore County, accounted for the 
majority of foreclosure activity in Maryland.  Within these six jurisdictions the majority of 
foreclosures occurred in Price George’s County and Montgomery County, and foreclosures in 
these counties clustered spatially (DHCD 2009).  Figures 2, 3, and 4 present the location 






One of the primary drivers of any traditional foreclosure decision is job loss, and 
Maryland, with its proximity to DC, the Federal government and Federal contractor workforce 
acts as a firewall that protects the region from the full brunt of an economic downturn.  For 
example, as of the middle of 2009 the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the unemployment 
rate in Maryland is 15th lowest and the year over year increase in the unemployment rate is 7th 
lowest in the nation.  The counties in our study area all rank in the bottom third in unemployment 
rate, between 5.4 and 7.69 ().  However, over the same time interval Maryland ranks 12th in the 
nation in foreclosure rate according to Realty Trac (DHCD 2009).  In short, Maryland is at or 
near the lowest quartile in unemployment statistics while being near the highest quintile in 
foreclosure activity.  
This relates directly to our social interactions research because we do not directly observe 
job loss at a household level.  However, we assume the spatial distribution of job loss is random 
within a census tract.  One would not expect highly localized spatial pockets of job loss as one 
might expect in a less diverse or more vulnerable labor market such as Las Vegas, Phoenix, 
Florida, or areas of California where foreclosures have been highest. In other words, a mass 
layoff event at one factory or in one highly specialized sector will not affect one suburban block 
of homes disproportionately more than any other suburban block of homes in the same census 
tract.5
Nationally, foreclosures tended to be driven by the dramatic fall in house prices due to 
bursting of the house price bubble.  Although variation in the boom was highly spatially varied, 
Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2010) estimate the extent of the increase is potentially as high as 
46% in real terms between 2001 and 2005.  The national fall in house prices from their peak in 
July 2006 was at least one-third by April of 2009 and remained above one-quarter through 
 
                                                             






August 2010 (S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices).  The experience in the DC-Washington 
metropolitan area was consistent with the national decline in house prices.  As of December of 
2009, the Case-Shiller house price index decreased by 29% as compared to the peak of house 
prices in Washington DC in March 2006.  The Maryland study area therefore experienced an 
average house price decline, as compared to the nation.  This implies our results are not driven 
by a localized collapse in house prices as was experienced in the high foreclosure states of 
Nevada, Arizona, Florida, and California.   
If foreclosures are not driven by job loss, and the extent of the price decline is near the 
national average, then strategic defaults motivated by reduced moral and social constraints on 
default is left as a primary driver of foreclosures in Maryland.  Overall, strategic defaults likely 
play a significant role in the relatively high foreclosure rates in Maryland.  Since strategic 
defaults are influenced by moral and social constraints on foreclosure (Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales 2009), this aids our identification of the role of endogenous interactions, in particular 
preference interactions, on neighborhood foreclosures.   
 
Data and variable selection 
We include variables controlling for contextual interactions and correlated effects in an 
attempt to isolate the influence of endogenous interactions on foreclosures.  The variables listed 
in Table 1 are classified by household characteristics, neighborhood and community 
characteristics, loan attributes, house prices, unemployment, as well as the endogenous social 







Households reference the actions of other households in their immediate neighborhood, 
defined in this study as the nearest thirteen households in terms of distance.  The endogenous 
interaction variables are constructed based on the percentage of neighbors that have foreclosed 
and the mean time to foreclosure since the beginning of the sample period (January 2006), both 
adjusted monthly through the sample period of 2006 through 2009.   
Household characteristics 
We include a number of household-level characteristics representing correlated effects.  
Measures of the quality of house construction broken down into four categories, low, average, 
good, and very good (where average is omitted from the model) are used as a proxy for the value 
of the house, which should be correlated with the income and wealth of the household.  One third 
of the houses in our sample are considered low quality, half average quality, and approximately 
15% are rated as good or very good quality.   
We control for owner-occupancy with a dummy variable equal to one if the household is 
an owner-occupier.  Gerardi and Willen (2009) find that owner-occupied houses are less likely to 
go into foreclosure.  Since the costs of foreclosure are higher for owner-occupied houses due to 
relocation costs and sentimental attachment to community, we expect owner-occupied houses are 
less likely to go into foreclosure.  The age of the house is included to control for the vintage of 
construction as well as to control for the equity position of the homeowner.  We expect newly 
constructed houses to have larger outstanding mortgages and as a consequence, owners of newly 
constructed homes are more likely to be in negative equity positions due to recent price 






with attachment to community and potential stigma due to default.  Longer current tenure is 
therefore expected to reduce the likelihood of foreclosure.6 7
Finally, we observe whether or not the property is a multi-family home.  Previous studies 
have shown that condos and multi-family properties are more likely to foreclose (Gerardi, 
Shapiro, and Willen 2009; Foote, Gerardi, and Willen 2008).  We do not have strong a priori 
expectations for multi-family properties in Maryland as the unfolding of this crisis does not have 
a peer in recent memory.   
   
Neighbourhood and community characteristics 
We control for a significant number of potential contextual interactions using socio-
demographic indicators at the Census tract and block-group levels.  Median rent, percent college 
educated, percent below poverty line, the percent of state median income of loan applicant, and 
the percent minority population are included as Census tract-level controls.  We also include 
population density at the block level as a control for the extent of urbanization in the community.  
As a control for the stability of the neighborhood, we include average turnover in properties over 
the last five years (measured at the Census block level).   
As required for empirical identification, a number of variables are measured at the 
‘neighborhood’ level as opposed to the household level, once again controlling for contextual 
interactions that may drive common behavior within neighborhoods.  We construct a number of 
neighborhood-level variables within a 500m buffer of each house.  Figures 5 and 6 show the size 
of the 500m buffer relative to the thirteen nearest neighbors and illustrate how this definition of 
the neighborhood varies with the density of the area.   
                                                             
6 The current ownership tenure may also be correlated with lower outstanding mortgages.  We cannot say for sure – 
there may be large second mortgages out on houses with relatively long ownership tenures.   
7 Foote et al. (2008) model the baseline hazard as a third order polynomial in the age of ownership experience.  The 






We construct the ratio of multi-family to total buildings, as well as the ratio of 
commercial/industrial buildings to total buildings.  Both variables capture potential sorting of 
individuals into different types of neighborhoods.  We include the percentage of owner-occupied 
houses in the neighbourhood – previous research indicates that owner-occupied properties are 
less likely to foreclose.  Neighborhoods with shorter tenure are more likely to have been recently 
developed and are also more likely to have weaker social connections among residents.  Houses 
in these neighborhoods are therefore more likely to foreclose.  We include the 25th percentile, 
50th percentile, and 75th percentile tenure values.  We also include the median age of the home.  
Older homes likely carry lower mortgage balances and are less likely to be in negative equity 
positions.  Also, unless these houses have been refinanced, house price depreciation should not 
have as large an influence on the likelihood of foreclosure.  
Loans 
Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2009) find that household’s with subprime loans are more 
likely to enter into foreclosure.  To the extent that subprime loans went to low income 
households, the prevalence of subprime loans in a community can be thought of as a correlated 
effect – communities with more subprime loans are more likely to experience higher foreclosure 
rates because the types of households with subprime loans are correlated.  Indeed, as discussed in 
Gerardi and Willen (2009), borrowers that use the subprime market tend to have poorer credit 
histories, higher initial loan-to-value ratios, and high debt-to-income ratios.  The percentage of 
the 2006 loan portfolio deemed as subprime classification is defined as loans where the rate 
spread is greater than 3 percentage points on the first lien and 5 on subordinate liens. 
 We include a number of additional variables characterizing loan activity at the Census 






have extracted equity from their houses.  We expect refinance activity to be positively correlated 
with the likelihood of foreclosure.  A higher ratio of conventional and home improvement loans 
increases the likelihood that households intend to remain in their current home.  We expect a 
high ratio of non-owner occupied loans to total loans is positively correlated with foreclosures 
because these houses tend to be used as rental properties and the owners do not incur the 
relocation costs associated with foreclosure.   
House prices and unemployment 
 Depreciation in house prices increases the likelihood of foreclosure (Bajari, Chu, and 
Park 2010).  Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) use a town-level house price index to measure 
the equity position of households – they present evidence that negative equity, brought about by 
house price depreciation, increases the likelihood of foreclosure.  Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen 
(2009) show that foreclosures tend to be driven by house price depreciation as opposed to 
insufficiently cautious underwriting.  We include an annual repeat sales house price index at the 
sub-county level as well as the percent off peak values of the house price index.8
We include a measure of the average unemployment rate at the city or county level over 
the previous twelve months.  There is mixed evidence regarding the importance of changes in 
unemployment in explaining foreclosure activity.  Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2009) find that 
changes in town-level cumulative unemployment rates have no impact on foreclosures.  Foote, 
Gerardi, and Willen (2008) find that the unemployment rate has a positive impact on foreclosure.  
  House price 
index variables control for contextual interactions due to variation in house price expectations at 
the sub-county level.  The peak year values range from 2005 to 2008 with 35% of the sample 
experiencing peak prices in 2006 and another 58% in 2007. 
                                                             







Bajari, Chu, and Park (2008) find that the monthly county-level unemployment rate has a 
negative impact on the likelihood of foreclosure.  We include measures of mean unemployment 
and the standard deviation in unemployment as a control for the exogenous influence of shocks 
to employment that are common within communities. 
 
Results 
The results for the Cox proportional and the piece-wise exponential models are reported 
in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively.  The results are expressed as hazard ratios, implying that 
values greater than one indicate that the independent variable increases the hazard of foreclosure, 
whereas values less than one indicate the independent variable reduces the hazard of foreclosure.   
Endogenous interactions 
Overall, we find strong evidence that endogenous interactions influence foreclosure 
decisions.  The estimated hazard ratios on the endogenous interaction variables are significant in 
all of the models, and statistically significant at least at the 1% level in six of the seven.  Further, 
the estimated hazard ratios are stable across models.  In the Cox proportional models, a one unit 
increase in neighboring foreclosures increases the hazard of foreclosure by as much as 3%.  The 
mean time to foreclosure among those neighbors that do foreclose, increases the hazard rate of 
foreclosure by less than 1%.   In the piecewise exponential models, a one unit increase in the 
number of neighboring foreclosures increases the hazard rate of foreclosure by between 2 and 
4%.  A one unit increase in the mean time to foreclose among those neighbors that do foreclose, 
increases the hazard rate of foreclosure by less than 1%.  Results for the endogenous interaction 







 As with the endogenous interaction variables, results for the household characteristics are 
robust to alternative model specifications and are generally consistent with expectations.  We 
find that houses of lower quality construction are more likely to foreclose as compared to houses 
of average quality construction.  In fact, the effect of quality is quite large – a low quality house 
is approximately 50% more likely to foreclose than an average or an above average quality 
house.  We expect that quality of housing controls for household income, and if this is the case, 
that low income households are more likely to foreclose.  This is consistent with the notion that 
low income households are less able to withstand income shocks and house price depreciation, 
and are therefore more likely to foreclose. 
 Owner occupied houses are far less likely to foreclose when compared to rental 
properties.  An owner occupied house reduces the hazard rate of foreclosure by almost 50%.  
This is likely due to the fact that an owner occupier must bear relocation costs in the event of a 
foreclosure, whereas a rental property owner does not.  The age of the house has a statistically 
significant, although small, impact on foreclosure.  We find that households in older homes are 
more likely to foreclose but the effect is small; a one year increase in the age of the house 
increases the hazard of foreclosure by less than one percent.  Households that have longer tenure 
periods are less likely to foreclose.  A one year increase in ownership tenure reduces the hazard 
rate of foreclosure by approximately 6%.  This is consistent with the fact that households with 
longer tenure are more likely to have stronger ties to their current communities and are therefore 
less willing to choose foreclosure.  Perhaps more important than ties to the community, 
households with longer tenures likely have lower loan to value ratios, both because they have 
had more time to pay down principle and because they were less likely to purchase during the 






correlated with the likelihood of foreclosure (Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen 2009), we find that 
multi-family dwelling are less likely to foreclose than single family properties.   
Neighborhood and community characteristics 
Neighborhood and community characteristic are included in the hazard models as controls 
for the correlated effects that might otherwise cause neighbors to have a similar propensity to 
foreclose.  We find that neighborhood and community characteristics are statistically significant 
in the majority of cases.  The greater the percent of the population below the poverty line in a 
given Census tract, the less likely a household within that Census tract is to foreclose.  Greater 
population density tends to increase the likelihood of foreclosure, whereas households in Census 
tracts with higher median incomes tend to be less likely to foreclose.  Households in Census 
tracts with higher percentage minority population are more likely to foreclose, consistent with 
results of previous research showing that minority borrowers are more likely to have subprime 
loans.   
Hazard ratio estimates for the neighborhood characteristics are stable across all model 
specifications.  An increase in the percent of owner-occupied units in the neighborhood has a 
positive impact on the hazard rate of foreclosure.  An increase in neighbors’ tenure in the 25th 
percentile reduces the likelihood of foreclosure by as much as 8%, whereas an increase in 
neighbors’ tenure in the 75th percentile has little, if any, impact on the hazard rate of foreclosure.  
These results suggest that the tenure of a household’s newest neighbors can have a significant 
impact on foreclosures.  An increase in the median age of structures in the neighborhood 
decreases the hazard rate of foreclosure by less than 1%.  The neighborhood level ratio of multi-
family units to total units reduced the likelihood of foreclosure, whereas the ratio of commercial 






with a higher average property turnover rate tended to be more likely to foreclose – a one unit 
increase in the average turnover rate increases the hazard rate of foreclosure by 6% to 7% in all 
of the hazard model specifications.  This result is consistent with the notion that households have 
fewer ties in less stable communities, as measured by turnover in properties.   
Loan characteristics 
 Households in Census tracts with a greater percentage of subprime loans, as a share of all 
residential loans, are more likely to foreclose.  Being in a Census tract with more than 53% 
subprime loans increases the hazard rate of foreclosure by more than 100%, compared to being 
in a Census tract with less than 13% in subprime loans.  These results are consistent with 
previous research indicating that subprime loans go to riskier borrowers and are more sensitive to 
depreciation in house values (Geradri, Shapiro, and Willen 2009).  The extent of refinance, 
conventional, home improvement, and non-occupancy loans at the Census tract level appears to 
have little impact on the hazard rate of foreclosure.   
Prices and unemployment 
 A higher price index tends to increase the likelihood of foreclosure, albeit very slightly.  
Similarly, an increases in the percent prices are below their peak values tends to increase the 
hazard rate in the majority of the models (in four of the seven) and decreases the hazard rate in 
two of the seven models.  This suggests that a fall in house prices from their peak influences the 
likelihood of foreclosure, but the magnitude of the impact may be quite small.      
A higher average unemployment rate (over the previous twelve months) reduces the 
likelihood of foreclosure.  This is somewhat surprising considering the fact that job loss is 
typically a factor that increases the likelihood of foreclosure.  Further, previous empirical 






foreclosure.  Our results may reflect the fact that job loss was not an important factor in 
Maryland foreclosures.  The variability in foreclosure, measured by the standard deviation of 
foreclosure (over the previous twelve months), has a positive impact on the hazard of foreclosure 
indicating the appropriate measure of the unemployment might be something other than the 
mean as is commonly used.   
 
Conclusions 
 Using a unique and highly disaggregate data set with an appropriate measure of 
neighborhood we reveal the existence of an important but overlooked behavioral aspect of this 
foreclosure crisis. This period of foreclosures most assuredly will demonstrate price spillovers as 
shown many times in the previous literature but it also has the potential of lowering the barriers 
to exit from the repayment obligation to homeowners mortgage lenders. When a neighbor’s 
foreclosure impacts the likelihood of you repaying your loan the conditions are present for the 
negative effects implied by the social multiplier suggested by Manski. If my peer group no 
longer stigmatizes foreclosure and it is in my short term best interest, I may “walk away” from 
my debt obligation which, in turn, impacts a new set of neighbors and so on.  Policy implications 
from this research suggest that foreclosure prevention is of utmost importance but future work 
should focus on the tradeoffs between the pace of foreclosure to resell compared to the upfront 









Bajari, Patrick, Chenghuan Sean Chu, and Minjung Park. 2008. “An Empirical Model of 
Subprime Mortgage Default from 2000 to 2007,” NBER Working Paper 14625. 
 
Brock, William A. and Steven N. Durlauf. 2001. “Interactions-based Models,” in Handbook of 
Econometrics, eds. J.J. Heckman and E. Leamer, New York: Elsevier Science, pp. 3297-3380. 
 
Campbell, John, Stefano Giglio, and Parag Pathak. 2009. “Forced Sales and House Prices,” 
NBER Working Paper No. 14866. 
 
Collett, D. 1994. Modelling Survival Data in Medical Research, London:  Chapman & Hall. 
Foote, Christopher, Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul Willen. 2008. “Negative Equity and 
Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Urban Economics 64: 234-245. 
 
DHCD (Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development). 2009. Property 
Foreclosures in Maryland Third Quarter 2009. 
http://www.mdhope.org/Documents/PropertyForeclosureEventsinMaryland09Q3.pdf 
 




Gerardi, Kristopher, Adam Hale Shapiro, and Paul Willen. 2009. “Decomposing the Foreclosure 
Crisis: House Price Depreciation versus Bad Underwriting,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
Working Paper September 2009-25. 
 
Gerardi, Kristopher and Paul Willen. 2009. “Subprime Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Urban 
Neighborhoods,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 9(3) Symposium Article 
12. 
 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2009. “Moral and Social Constraints to 
Straegic Default on Mortgages,” NBER Working Paper No. 15145. 
 
Glaeser, Edward L., Joshua D. Gottlieb, and Joseph Gyourko. 2010. “Can Cheap Credit Explain 
the Housing Boom?” NBER Working Paper 16230.  
 
Harding, John, Eric Rosenblatt, and Vincent Yao. 2009. “The Contagion Effect of Foreclosed 
Properties,” Journal of Urban Economics 66: 164-178. 
 
Iaonnidies, Y, and J. Zabel. 2002. “Neighborhood Effects and Housing Demand,” Journal of 
Applied Econometrics. 
 








Mayer, Christopher, Karen Pence, and Shane M. Sherland. 2009. “The Rise in Mortgage 
Defaults,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(1): 27-50. 
 
Sirakaya, Sibel. 2006. “Recidivism and Social Interactions,” Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 101(475): 863-877. 
 
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP). 2010. “Factors 
Affecting Implementation of the Home Affordable Modification Program,” SIGTARP-10-




Thaler, Richard. 2010. “Underwater, But Will They Leave the Pool?” The New York Times 
January 24, 2010.  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/business/economy/24view.html?_r=1 
 
White, Brent. 2010. “Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social 




Table 1: Data description 
 Variable Description 
Social Interaction Variables 
percentFC percentage of neighboring foreclosures 
meanTimeToFC among the FC neighbors the mean time to foreclosure in months 
Household Characteristics 
ownQualityLow construction quality low 
ownQualityGood construction quality good 
ownQualityVGood construction quality very good 
ownerOccupied owner occupied house 
ageHome age of structure 
ownerTenure length of time owner owns house 
condo condomium indicator 
Neighborhood and Community Characteristics 
medianRent median rent by tract 
percentCollege percent college educated by tract 
percentPoverty percent below poverty by tract 
popDensity population density by block 
medianIncome percent of state median income by tract 
percentMinority percent minority by tract 
nOwnerOccupied percent of owner occupied units in 500 meter buffer 
nTenure_25thPtile 25th percentile of neighbors tenure in 500 meter buffer 
nTenure_50thPtile 50th percentile of neighbors tenure in 500 meter buffer 
nTenure_75thPtile 75th percentile of neighbors tenure in 500 meter buffer 
nMedianAge median age of structures in 500 meter buffer 
ratioMultiFamily ratio of multifamily units to total units in 500 meter buffer 
ratioComm ratio of commercial units to total units in 500 meter buffer 
averageChurn the average turnover rate for properties by blockgroup from 2000-05 
Loan Characteristics 
subPrime53-100 percentage of 2006 loans that are subprime by tract  
subPrime36-53 percentage of 2006 loans that are subprime by tract  
subPrime25-36 percentage of 2006 loans that are subprime by tract  
subPrime13-25 percentage of 2006 loans that are subprime by tract  
refinanceRatio ratio of refinance loans to total loans by tract 
conventionalRatio ratio of conventional loans to total loans by tract 
homeImpRatio ratio of home improvement loans to total loans by tract 
nonOccupantLoanRatio ratio of non occupant loans to total loans by tract 
Price and Unemployment 
priceIndex base 2000 repeat sales price index by tract (XX tract merged for data reasons) 
percentOffPeak percent below peak index value by tract 
unempMean previous 12 month average unemployment 
unempSD standard deviation in previous 12 unemployment  
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 Variable Mean Std.Dev. Range 
Social Interaction Variables 
percentFC 1.89 4.56 0.00 69.23 
meanTimeToFC 3.40 10.65 0.00 51.88 
Household Characteristics 
ownQualityLow 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
ownQualityGood 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
ownQualityVGood 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
ownerOccupied 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 
ageHome 32.11 23.69 0.00 307.00 
ownerTenure 8.41 9.58 0.00 95.00 
condo 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Neighborhood and Community Characteristics 
medianRent 711.34 189.59 0.00 1001.00 
percentCollege 59.64 18.26 0.00 100.00 
percentPoverty 4.19 3.98 0.00 96.00 
popDensity 22.39 36.97 0.00 2486.43 
medianIncome 115.12 35.93 0.00 279.00 
percentMinority 39.77 28.01 1.00 99.00 
nOwnerOccupied 57.27 35.32 0.00 100.00 
nTenure_25thPtile 2.20 1.91 0.00 55.00 
nTenure_50thPtile 5.42 3.99 0.00 66.00 
nTenure_75thPtile 11.41 7.96 0.00 67.00 
nMedianAge 24.77 20.85 1.00 283.00 
ratioMultiFamily 12.07 24.28 0.00 99.84 
ratioComm 4.44 6.84 0.00 100.00 
averageChurn 5.37 2.65 0.00 33.33 
Loan Characteristics 
subPrime53-100 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
subPrime36-53 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 
subPrime25-36 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
subPrime13-25 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
refinanceRatio 0.79 0.29 0.00 3.50 
conventionalRatio 0.74 0.29 0.00 3.73 
homeImpRatio 0.56 0.32 0.00 2.56 
nonOccupantLoanRatio 0.68 0.28 0.00 2.67 
Price and Unemployment 
priceIndex 75.74 12.49 27.94 182.85 
percentOffPeak 3.93 7.65 0.00 65.26 
unempMean 4.22 1.46 2.52 10.16 
unempSD 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.91 
 
  
Table 3: Piecewise Exponential Results 
          2 intervals 4 Intervals Gamma Frailty  
  Haz Ratio Std Err   Haz Ratio Std Err   
Haz 
Ratio Std Err   
Social Interaction Variables 
percentFC 1.02 0.00 * 1.04 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 
meanTimeToFC 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 *** 
Household Characteristics 
ownQualityLow 1.48 0.02 * 1.45 0.02 * 1.55 0.02 * 
ownQualityGood 1.01 0.02   0.95 0.02   1.11 0.03 * 
ownQualityVGood 1.02 0.05   1.05 0.05   1.31 0.07 * 
ownerOccupied 0.52 0.01 * 0.60 0.01 * 0.52 0.01 * 
ageHome 1.01 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 1.01 0.00 * 
ownerTenure 0.94 0.00 * 0.95 0.00 * 0.94 0.00 * 
condo 0.79 0.02 * 0.83 0.02 * 0.85 0.02 * 
Neighborhood and Community Characteristics 
medianRent 1.00 0.00 ** 1.00 0.00 ** 1.00 0.00 * 
percentCollege 1.00 0.00 * 0.99 0.00 * 1.01 0.00 * 
percentPoverty 0.99 0.00 * 0.96 0.00 * 0.98 0.00 * 
popDensity 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00   1.00 0.00 * 
medianIncome 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 0.99 0.00 * 
percentMinority 1.01 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 1.01 0.00 * 
nOwnerOccupied 1.02 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 
nTenure_25thPtile 0.93 0.01 * 0.92 0.01 * 0.92 0.01 * 
nTenure_50thPtile 0.96 0.00 * 0.97 0.00 * 0.99 0.01 ** 
nTenure_75thPtile 1.01 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 1.00 0.00   
nMedianAge 1.00 0.00 * 0.99 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 
ratioMultiFamily 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00   1.00 0.00   
ratioComm 1.02 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 1.01 0.00 * 
averageChurn 1.07 0.00 * 1.06 0.00 * 1.07 0.00 * 
Loan Characteristics 
subPrime53-100 2.04 0.06 * 2.00 0.06 * 3.17 0.41 * 
subPrime36-53 2.10 0.05 * 1.89 0.05 * 2.98 0.29 * 
subPrime25-36 1.72 0.04 * 1.66 0.04 * 1.87 0.16 * 
subPrime13-25 1.59 0.03 * 1.63 0.04 * 1.39 0.10 * 
refinanceRatio 0.93 0.06   0.71 0.05 * 1.69 0.42 ** 
conventionalRatio 0.96 0.06   1.39 0.09 * 1.11 0.25   
homeImpRatio 1.10 0.02 * 0.94 0.02 * 1.13 0.09   
nonOccupantLoanRatio 0.99 0.04   0.81 0.03 * 0.74 0.08 * 
Price and Unemployment 
priceIndex 1.00 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 0.97 0.00 * 
percentOffPeak 0.89 0.00 * 1.08 0.00 * 0.89 0.00 * 
unempMean 0.56 0.01 * 0.45 0.01 * 0.48 0.01 * 
unempSD 3.08 0.18 * 32195 2100.15 * 24.34 1.52 * 
County Fixed Effects Yes     Yes     Yes     
*  <.01, ** <.05, *** <.10 
        
Table 4: Cox Model Results 
       Cox RE Cox (Gamma) FE Cox Cox Stratified 
Variable HR Std Err   HR Std Err   HR Std Err   HR Std Err   
Social Interaction Variables 
percentFC 1.03 0.00 * 1.03 0.00 * 1.03 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 
meanTimeToFC 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 
Household Characteristics 
ownQualityLow 1.53 0.10 * 1.49 0.02 * 1.49 0.02 * 1.49 0.02 * 
ownQualityGood 1.02 0.23   1.02 0.02   1.02 0.02   1.02 0.02   
ownQualityVGood 1.05 0.14   1.05 0.05   1.05 0.05   1.05 0.05   
ownerOccupied 0.54 0.05 * 0.52 0.01 * 0.52 0.01 * 0.52 0.01 * 
ageHome 1.01 0.00 * 1.01 0.00 * 1.01 0.00 * 1.01 0.00 * 
ownerTenure 0.94 0.00 * 0.94 0.00 * 0.94 0.00 * 0.94 0.00 * 
condo 0.82 0.08 ** 0.80 0.02 * 0.80 0.02 * 0.80 0.02 * 
Neighborhood and Community Characteristics 
medianRent 1.00 0.00   1.00 0.00 ** 1.00 0.00 ** 1.00 0.00 ** 
percentCollege 1.00 0.00   1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 
percentPoverty 0.99 0.01 ** 0.99 0.00 * 0.99 0.00 * 0.99 0.00 * 
popDensity 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 
medianIncome 1.00 0.00   1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 ** 1.00 0.00 ** 
percentMinority 1.01 0.00 * 1.01 0.00 * 1.01 0.00 * 1.01 0.00 * 
nOwnerOccupied 1.01 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 
nTenure_25thPtile 0.91 0.01 * 0.93 0.01 * 0.93 0.01 * 0.93 0.01 * 
nTenure_50thPtile 0.98 0.02   0.97 0.00   0.97 0.00   0.97 0.00 * 
nTenure_75thPtile 1.01 0.01   1.01 0.00   1.01 0.00   1.01 0.00 * 
nMedianAge 0.99 0.00 * 0.99 0.00 * 0.99 0.00 * 0.99 0.00 * 
ratioMultiFamily 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 
ratioComm 1.01 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 1.02 0.00 * 
averageChurn 1.06 0.02 * 1.07 0.00 * 1.07 0.00 * 1.07 0.00 * 
Loan Characteristics 
subPrime53-100 2.41 0.51 * 2.23 0.06 * 2.23 0.06 * 2.23 0.06 * 
subPrime36-53 2.40 0.37 * 2.25 0.05 * 2.25 0.05 * 2.25 0.05 * 
subPrime25-36 2.00 0.31 * 1.94 0.04 * 1.94 0.04 * 1.94 0.04 * 
subPrime13-25 1.63 0.22 * 1.68 0.04 * 1.68 0.04 * 1.67 0.04 * 
refinanceRatio 1.18 0.31   1.03 0.07   1.03 0.07   1.03 0.07   
conventionalRatio 0.83 0.15   0.86 0.05   0.86 0.05   0.87 0.05   
homeImpRatio 1.01 0.04   1.02 0.02   1.02 0.02   1.02 0.02   
nonOccLoanRatio 1.08 0.13   1.06 0.04   1.06 0.04   1.05 0.04   
Price and Unemployment 
priceIndex 1.01 0.00 *** 1.01 0.00 * 1.01 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 * 
percentOffPeak 1.01 0.01   1.01 0.00 ** 1.01 0.00 ** 1.02 0.00 * 
unempMean 1.20 0.06 * 0.98 0.02   0.98 0.02   0.96 0.02 ** 
unempSD 0.36 0.19 *** 0.70 0.08 * 0.70 0.08 * 0.78 0.12 ** 
County Dummies No     No     Yes           
*  <.01, ** <.05, *** <.10 
          
 
Marginal Effects from Cox models 
          
  Cox     RE Cox     FE Cox     
Stratified 





Err   
Marg 
Effect Std Err   
Marg 
Effect Std Err   
Marg 
Effect Std Err   
Social Interaction Variables 
percentFC 0.246 0.16   0.094 0.012 * 0.164 0.021 ** 0.081 0.010 * 
meanTimeToFC 0.022 0.01 ** 0.008 0.003 * 0.014 0.005 * 0.007 0.002 * 
*  <.01, ** <.05, *** <.10 
          
  




Figure 2: 2006 Foreclosure activity 
 
  
Figure 3: 2006-2009 Foreclosure activity 
 
  
Figure 4: Number of Foreclosure events by year and county. 
 
Note: FC through 3Q of 2009  
Figure 5: Buffer illustration for dense area. 
 
  
Figure 6: Buffer illustration in rural area. 
 
